Introduction

The growing interest in Japanese philosophy in the western world in recent decades has prompted many western scholars to investigate the relationship between the thought of Nishida Kitarō and Martin Heidegger. Until recently, the few (explicit or implicit) comparisons between the two thinkers had generally been rather dismissive criticism of Heidegger’s thought by Japanese followers of Nishida and the Kyoto School, who, taking a clue from Nishida’s own criticism of early Heidegger’s philosophy, have argued that Heidegger was not radical enough in his overcoming of traditional western metaphysics. More recently, however, western (and sometimes Japanese) scholars familiar with Heidegger’s thought, and less biased against it, have convincingly argued that not only is such criticism largely due to a misunderstanding, but also that Nishida’s thought as well could be criticized from a Heideggerian standpoint as a form of metaphysics, in line with Heidegger’s own scant comments on Nishida’s philosophy.

Western scholars have also highlighted important similarities between the two philosophers, which can become the starting point for a fruitful dialogue between the East Asian and the European traditions. Broadly speaking, two points have been indicated as major similarities between Nishida’s and Heidegger’s philosophies: First, the fact that both were philosophies “in transition,” that is, radical philosophies that rethought the foundations of their own traditions to open new possibilities of thinking. Nishida was the first Japanese thinker to rethink in a systematic way an
East Asian worldview and its experience within a framework of western categories, while Heidegger scrutinized the fundamental ontological assumptions of the European philosophical tradition to understand its true meaning and find new ways of answering the basic questions from which it had originally been born. Second, the fact that both arrived at the notion of an empty opening as necessary condition of the appearance of phenomena, which Nishida named *locus* (場所) and Heidegger *clearing* (*Lichtung*) both connected the character of emptiness of the openness to a non-nihilistic idea of nothingness, which fulfils the function of overcoming the foundational ontologism of western metaphysics.

However, the emphasis on these common themes and notions has led scholars to overlook some relevant differences, which reflect the two philosophers' different historical backgrounds and personalities. In this essay, I will analyze Nishida's notion of locus and Heidegger's notion of clearing to point out both similarities and differences, emphasizing the differences that have been overlooked by other interpreters. Such differences reflect not only the different personalities of the two philosophers, but also their different cultural backgrounds, and thus cannot be ignored in any comparison between the East Asian and the European philosophical and spiritual traditions based on a comparison between Nishida and Heidegger.4

**Parallel Paths**

Although the conceptual similarities between Heidegger and Nishida highlighted by scholars tend to relate to the later phases of their philosophical development, since the beginning of their philosophical endeavor the two thinkers moved along parallel paths that led them from similar problems to similar solutions. The historical situation of Nishida, a Japanese thinker trying to interpret his own tradition using the conceptual and linguistic tools of western philosophy, was undoubtedly different from the situation of Heidegger, a direct heir to the European and German philosophical tradition trying to rethink its foundations. However, as radical thinkers active at the beginning of the 20th century and steeped in western philosophy, they shared a common intellectual milieu and common goals.

Their common intellectual milieu was the worldview that favored the world of interiority and concrete experience over the scientistic reduction of reality to quantifiable objectivity that Positivist thinkers had advocated in the late 19th century. Nishida and Heidegger started philosophizing within the boundaries of a tradition that tended to identify reality with the field of human experience and avoided postulating a realm of objectively knowable things in themselves existing “out there.”5 Their common goal was to overcome the limitations they perceived in such a worldview. Nishida was critical of the subject-object dichotomy he saw underlying modern western philosophy and tried to overcome it by reformulating the concept of pure experience on the basis of the insights
gained thanks to his own practice of Zen Buddhism. He postulated a primordial and ultimate state of undifferentiated unity of subject and object (主客合一), which, from a metaphysical and epistemological point of view, had the purpose of explaining the dichotomy as a derivative mode of being. Heidegger as well, by defining the primordial form of experience as future-oriented existence thrown in the world and facing its own ineluctable finitude, refused the theoretical setup of a merely knowing, disinterested subject apprehending a simply present-at-hand (vorhanden) object.

Despite the originality and relevance of their ideas, however, both failed to give their positions an adequate theoretical formulation, relapsing to a large extent into a different form of the very same subjectivist perspective they had being trying to overcome. Both described the world of experience as a network of relationships in which every content is given not as an isolated unit, but as a knot where a multiplicity of references converges. In the early stages of their development, however, both enclosed the network itself within the subjective field of human experience, albeit in quite different ways. Nishida grounded the network in an absolute subject, a cosmic weaver that knits together the totality of the knots, thereby reducing the content of experience to a collection of ephemeral psychological phantoms, including individual human beings, whom he saw as mere passive outlets for the self-expression of the absolute, locked in the shadow theater of their individual field of consciousness. Heidegger, on the other hand, refused any notion of subject, absolute or relative, but described the network as beginning and ending in the opening (as the opening) of the single human existence (being there, Dasein) as self-referential temporality, in which the human being is ultimately always facing its own being as possibility of its own annihilation and can never authentically relate to anything other than itself.

In other words, both thinkers failed to account for the phenomenological datum of things given in the act of apprehension as other than the subjective act itself, whether such act is conceived as Nishida's act of consciousness (意識作用) or as Heidegger's thrown projection (geworfener Entwurf). In Nishida's case, the problem became apparent in his second major work, Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (自覚に於ける直観と反省), where he failed in his attempt to explain the contingent nature of the objects of knowledge within the framework of a deduction of reality from absolute consciousness. That failure led him to qualify absolute consciousness as absolute free will (絶対自由の意志) to explain the irrational character of experience, a stopgap solution that he later famously dismissed as a capitulation to mysticism. In the case of Heidegger, the problem became evident as the inability to progress from the analysis of being-in-the-world to the analysis of the sense of being in general, i.e., as the inability to complete Being and Time. The reason was the impossibility to account ontologically for the encounter with the presence (Anwesen) of things within the world, given that presence had been reduced to a derivative modality of the future-oriented ecstatic temporality (ekstatische Zeitlichkeit) of being-in-the-world, which encounters
things primarily and mostly (zunächst und zumeist) as mere future-oriented tools for the sake of its own self-referential existence.

These limitations prevented early Nishida and early Heidegger from going beyond the theoretical horizon of subjective idealism, although they, so to say, had drastically rearranged the landscape within it. The recognition of the fact that experience has the character of encounter with otherness—material things and fellow humans—which renders unsatisfactory descriptions of experience as fully immanent in subjective consciousness, is one of the main factors that led them to rethink the very foundations of their systems, allowing them to find broader positions from which to think about the nature and meaning of reality.

**Experience as Openness**

Nishida and Heidegger found a similar solution to the similar problem that had spurred the evolution of their thought. They postulated that the relationship between subject and object (the encounter of things by humans, in terms closer to Heidegger’s terminology) must happen in an already open arena that makes the relationship possible by enfolding both terms. Several analogies between the notions of locus and clearing can be identified. First and foremost, both notions refer to a dynamic openness that allows subject and object, humans and things to be separate while belonging to each other. Nishida conceived the notion of locus by reflecting on the shortcomings of his earlier metaphysics based on the primacy of the act of consciousness over its content, as he had postulated that the latter is posited by the former in an act of self-reflection, regarded in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* as akin to Fichte’s Tathandlung. He came to realize that such act of projection cannot grant the object the character of otherness that makes it knowable as an object (対象). As two terms of a relationship in order to be related must be located (於てある) in a common locus, so the act of consciousness and its content, I and not-I, must be enfolded by a common locus logically and ontologically prior to them, which allows the relationship to be established by granting them their mutual belonging while simultaneously preserving their mutual alterity.\(^8\)

Heidegger arrived at his notion of clearing by reflecting on the limits of his earlier attempt to ground in temporality the encounter with things by being-in-the-world: In *Being and Time*, being-in-the-world encounters things by an act of de-severing (removal of distance, Ent-fernung), interpreted as a modality of its future-oriented ecstatic temporality. (SZ 367 ff.) Such attempt was tantamount to an attempt to reduce space to time, which was bound to fail as it presupposed the very same spatiality it was supposed to dissolve into temporality,\(^9\) since the severance-distance (Ferne) that de-severing overcomes must precede de-severing itself. As Heidegger rhetorically asked in a note in his copy of *Being and Time*, “Woher die Ferne, die ent-fernt wird?” (SZ 442, note to p. 105)\(^10\) To
overcome this predicament, later Heidegger defined the severance that makes possible the de-severing encounter with things as an open region, describing it as an *Urphänomenon* that cannot be reduced to any other phenomenal structure. Things can be encountered by humans and become objects (*Gegenstände*) of representation only insofar as they come-towards (*gegnen*) humans within the region (*Gegend*), which constitutes the towards-which (*wozu*) of being-in-the-world’s projection. In the expanse (*Weite*) of the region, the things to which human dwelling (*Wohnen*, as later Heidegger renamed *In-Sein*) is referred can thus appear in their irreducible presence (KR 9).

The coming toward us of things within the region is symmetrical to the ecstatic movement of temporality whereby we as projection (*Entwurf*) go towards things. As in the case of Nishida’s locus, the notion of region establishes a symmetrical relationship between subject and object, projecting human and encountered things, thus overcoming the asymmetry that in *Being and Time* had prevented Heidegger from giving an adequate account of the being of things. Human ek-sistence (*Ek-sistenz*), defined as the temporally ek-static opening of the world in *Being and Time*, is thus reinterpreted as spatial in-sisting (*Inständigkeit*) in an already opened region (*offene Gegend*), and the active movement of projection simultaneously becomes the passive reception of things as they are, the “letting be present” (*Anwesenlassen*) of the entities revealed in the clearing (SD 5 ff., 13).

Heidegger’s clearing has an undeniable spatial dimension, which possesses the two complementary aspects of opening and emptiness. The opening of the clearing is described in *Contributions to Philosophy* (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*) as the appropriating event (*Ereigniss*) of withdrawing that spreads open the emptiness (*Leere*) in which things can manifest themselves, and from which the event as withdrawing can beckon to us in its otherness.11) Emptiness is opened as cleavage (*Zerklüftung*) that separates the “here” of humans facing the world from a yonder out of which the world is given to them—whereas in *Sein und Zeit* the “there” of things was unilaterally defined on the basis of, and implicitly derived from, the “here” of Dasein. Whereas earlier Heidegger hinted at the etymological relationship of *Lichtung* and *Licht*, later Heidegger explicitly associated *Lichtung* and *leicht*, emphasizing the clearing’s spatial character of empty openness.

Nishida’s locus as well has an undeniable spatial connotation, though in Nishida’s case the role played by spatiality in the birth and articulation of the notion is not as strong as in Heidegger’s thought.12) The very term *basho* is used in everyday Japanese mainly in the spatial sense of “place,” “position,” and Nishida introduced the notion repeatedly using physical relationships in space as examples, even referring to a “space of consciousness” (意識の空間 III 420 f.). Furthermore, Nishida stated that his notion of locus was influenced by Plato’s concept of *khôra* (χώρα)13)—an undifferentiated spatial receptacle that receives the forms and constitutes the *principium individua-
tionis for physical things." Heidegger himself referred to Plato’s concept of ὀρᾶ, underscoring the possible similarity with his notion of clearing by wondering if it could indicate that which separates (abstracts) itself from every particular, that which by withdrawing allows and ‘makes place’ for something else.

Nishida also stated that the relation to a “you” in experience—which is an essential element of the self-aware determination of reality, as negative factor in the dialectic of contradictory self-identity—is not reducible to temporality, being rather made possible by a dimension of spatiality that determines time itself (時そのものを限定する空間的ななるもの V 313). As Heidegger’s space as Spielraum allows the unfolding of the temporal movement of human existence towards the irreducible otherness given in experience, the time-determining spatial aspect of Nishida’s locus is what allows the absolute other to be encountered as such. Unlike Nishida’s approach, Heidegger’s is not explicitly dialectical, since the other made possible by spatiality is not described as the negative element of a self-contradictory movement. Nevertheless, the negative, oppositional character of the other encountered within spatiality is explicitly affirmed in the etymological analysis of the Gegend, as related to gegen and gegnen, and accordingly to Gegenstand and Gegenwart, and in the characterization of human’s finitude as defined by spatiality, in contrast to Being and Time’s unilateral stress on the temporal finitude of being-towards-death. As Nishida’s individual can be what it is only in the dialectical relationship of mutual reflection between individual and world and between individuals as I and thou, Heidegger’s mortals become themselves only as expropriated to the other elements of the world in the mirroring play (Spiegel-Spiel) of the fourfold (Geviert).

As the opening in which the other can be encountered must be empty to make room for the fullness of things, so it must be nothing (no-thing) to allow for things to be something. Both Nishida and Heidegger use the term nothingness (無 nichts) to refer to the ultimate origin of phenomenal reality, and this allows them to account for mortality and the impermanence of things. Nishida, however, uses the term “nothingness” in a more fundamental meaning than “being,” making it the fundamental concept of his philosophy, whereas Heidegger tends rather to assert the identity of being and nothingness. This difference, as we will see, is related to an important, and overlooked, difference between the two thinkers.

Diverging Paths

The parallelism in the philosophical development of Nishida and Heidegger and the remarkable analogy between the concept of locus and the concept of clearing highlighted above, however, are only half the story. The point of maximum convergence of the two paths is the point where they begin to diverge, as the meaning that they attribute to the opening of locus and clearing
as ground of reality, and consequently the way in which they conceive the radical otherness given to humans in experience, is rather different.

Both Nishida’s locus and Heidegger’s clearing are not fixed structures within which reality is actualized, being rather the *actus essendi* that allows the actualization. As such, they have an internal dynamic that can be described in positive terms, despite their ultimate character of unobjectifiable emptiness and no-thingness. The different ways in which this dynamic is conceived by Nishida and Heidegger reveal an important difference in their thought. For Nishida, reality arises in the self-referential movement by which locus, compared to a luminous mirror, reflects itself within itself. In the early stages of development of the logic of locus, Nishida asymmetrically conceived such movement as a sort of cosmogonic contraction—to borrow from Cusanus’s notion of *contractio*—by which the world is enfolded within locus as a metaphysically derivative self-image that locus projects within itself. Later Nishida modified his position, identifying the world itself as the absolute and describing its self-referential movement as a simultaneous movement of contraction and expansion, a symmetrical mirroring play in which the projected, enfolded object, as contracted locus, simultaneously expands as projecting subject that in turn enfolds locus as the world. The contraction of the world is thus not a simple projection within itself of individuals as passive images of itself, but rather the world contracting itself within itself becomes the individuals, and its projection becomes the image of the world projected by each individual as focal point of world activity and world expression (自己焦点 X, 300), i.e., as individuated locus, one of the fragments, as it were, in which the cosmic mirror fragments itself in the cosmogonic play of self-reflection. The symmetry of the movement, however, does not entail the perfect equivalence of world and individuals: Since the world as absolute exceeds and overwhelms the individual as relative and finite, Nishida qualifies their relationship as inverse correspondence (逆対応 X, 315).

For Heidegger, the clearing is neither a movement of contraction within itself, as in the earlier development of the logic of locus, nor a movement of simultaneous contraction and expansion, as in late Nishida’s symmetrical dialectic of self-reflection of the world. It is rather a movement of withdrawing that rips open a cleavage, an open space where things and humans can come into being as relating to each other. The spatial opening of the cleavage as *Zeit-Spiel-Raum* creates a tension that sets in motion the movement of temporality—the fascination in which humans, as one extremity of the cleavage, are raptured towards the otherness that is given as the opposite extremity, and ultimately hinted at as the concealed side of the region in the withdrawing that opens the cleavage. In this respect, whereas Nishida’s self-determination of the world can be envisioned as the self-filling of an original emptiness, Heidegger’s clearing could instead be envisioned as the opposite process of self-emptying that opens up an emptiness, and might even be interpreted as the ripping open of a sort of primordial pleroma. Such opening coincides with the field of human
experience, of which human beings are neither the creators nor the owners, but just one polar element, performing the important but subordinate function of safekeepers.

The formal difference highlighted above may seem negligible, especially when one considers the fact that Heidegger's goal was not the establishment of a formal system, and he deliberately resorted to metaphorical and poetical language to express his views. However, the formal difference points to a deeper, more substantial divergence. In the case of Nishida, the description of the actualization of reality is meant to fully explain the existence of reality. Although Nishida at first introduced the notion of locus as the necessary condition for the apprehension of things, he also wanted to provide the sufficient condition for the apprehension. He thus qualified locus not only as receptive emptiness that concrete subjects and objects of experience can fill, thereby entering in a mutual relationship, but also as active self-reflecting mirror whose symmetrical acts of reflections constitute concrete subjects and objects in their relationship. By determining itself, absolute nothingness becomes the plurality of individuals determining each other as the dialectical world. Things placed within locus as its self-negating contractions are loci in themselves, individuals as contradictorily identical with the world are worlds in themselves, and therefore their existence is fully explained by the world's act of self-determination.

In contrast, Heidegger gives no explicit explanation of the origin of reality through a generative dynamic. From a logico-ontological point of view, the opening of the clearing itself constitutes only the necessary condition of the existence of entities—like Nishida's locus without the positive qualification as self-reflecting mirror—and no reason is given to justify the fact that the empty cleavage once ripped open is filled by entities. Heidegger does not tell us where the entities that in-sist (as mortals) or are given (as things) within the openness that is cleared (das Gelichtete) come from. For Heidegger humans and things occur within the clearing, but they are not clearings themselves, and cannot therefore be derived from the clearing as its determined forms in a way analogous to Nishida's individuals. To be sure, Heidegger defines things as places where the four of the fourfold can gather, (VA 149) but the notion of place (Ort) is quite different from that of the clearing: The movement of the clearing is the ripping open of a cleavage, whereas the essence of things as places is the inverse movement of convergent gathering of the opposite directions of the clearing symbolized by the four of the fourfold. Furthermore, no reason is given to explain the difference between the four or the difference between the four and the things that gather them. When we consider, for instance, mortals and gods as opposites separated by the opening of the cleavage, we may expect them to be in a symmetrical relationship, like I and thou in Nishida's system. But the relationship is clearly asymmetrical: The gods announce the hidden divine to the mortals, who are obediently listening (Hörender, Höriger). The mirroring play, in which the four of the fourfold become what they are by expropriating themselves to each other, is what bring the
four into their own being, but it cannot provide a reason for their existence or for their essential
difference. This is connected to the fact that the mirroring play is not the ultimate dynamic of the
clearing itself—in which case one could expect it to provide a full explanation of the nature of the
four as its necessary result—being rather a further movement within the opened cleavage allowed
by the primordial opening of the clearing. In the bestowing (in the *actus essendi* by which *es gibt
Sein*), the event of appropriation that makes things and the four of the fourfold come into being—the
full knowledge of which might allow us to fully account for the nature of experiential reality—is not
accessible to us. Phenomenologically, the region opened as the clearing has a side turned towards
us, which allows things to come forth in the open in their contour (G 54)—their *Umriß* (H 68), given
to us in the rift (Riß) that is the strife between clearing and concealing (Streit zwischen Lichtung
und Verbergung H 49)—but it has also a side turned away from us, whereby things can rest in
themselves (G 43). The appropriating event conceals itself as it withdraws to allow things to be,
thereby beckoning to the mortals from the side of the opening denied to them.

**The Other as ‘Thou’ and as *Totaliter Alter***

Heidegger’s idea of manifested things as beckoning reminds of Nishida’s notion of the world as
expression. Phenomena are ultimately signs, rather than mere objects meaninglessly filling a
portion of space and time, as they express something beyond their simple presence-at-hand.
However, Nishida and Heidegger conceive the nature of expression in rather different terms.
According to Nishida, things essentially express themselves as individuals that posit themselves in
a free act of self-determination, while expressing the world as totality of which they are constituting
parts. In this sense, the exemplary individual thing (個物) is for him the individual as self-aware
human being: The exemplary object given to us in experience is the thou of another human
personality, and our relationship to alterity is described as first and foremost the symmetrical
relationship between finite individuals who can interact as peers, mutually determining and
expressing each other. In this horizontal opposition that makes us self-aware,25 we become aware of
the vertical opposition to the world as the totality in which the I-thou relationship is enfolded.
Physical things as well, to be able to be opposed to us in experience as truly “doing things” (作
物), must, according to Nishida, partake of the nature of human individuals, possessing some form
of interiority as self-determining, self-expressing, and at least potentially self-aware individuals.26
There is no essential difference between entities located within locus, as they are all originated as
loci in the act of locus’ self-determination.

On the contrary, Heidegger describes the authentic relationship to otherness in experience
mostly as happening as and through the relationship to inanimate things that allows the relationship
to the non-human elements of the fourfold, like the artwork of *The Origin of the Work of Art* (Der
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, the jug of The Thing (Das Ding), or the farmhouse in the Black Forest of Building Dwelling Thinking (Bauen Wohnen Denken). Things to which we relate as given in the world do not simply express themselves, but something else that announces itself through them. The otherness thus encountered is not just the interiority of the objects given to us in our experience as external—what in Nishida’s terms can be conceived as that which the object itself experiences of itself in its own explicit or potential inner self-awareness (in its subjective-noetic aspect). It ultimately is the otherness of the appropriating event that conceals itself by the same act by which it lets things come into being. The artwork displays the earth from which it originates as what withdraws in itself refusing itself to apprehension and manipulation, making thus possible the safekeeping (Wahrnis) of the truth of the appropriating event as concealment (Verborgenheit, Verbergung), as in the case of the Greek temple that lets the divine come into the open by concealing it (H 27). The jug in The Thing, used in an act of offering, lets us as mortals be in relation to the immortal gods, through the openness of the sky in which the jug is given to us in its form and the closure of the earth in which the jug can rest in its own impenetrable materiality (VA 164). Even the gods, which might be the closest candidate to a thou in the framework of the fourfold, do not express themselves, but announce the divine as the mystery of the actualization of reality that lies behind our grasp.

The actualization of reality is for later Heidegger a sacred event in which a numinous alterity manifests itself to humans, the necessary condition for the shining of the holy, which he defines, in poetic language borrowed from Hölderlin, as the essential space of divinity (Wesensraum der Gottheit W 338) that grants the dimension to the gods and to the God. Spatiality as the fundamental dimension of openness is the bestowing of places where humans can dwell as waiting for the manifestations of the gods, and profane spaces are just the privative modification of hallowed spaces (KR 24). Whereas according to Nishida we as individuals define ourselves through our opposition to other individuals and to the world as totality, according to Heidegger we as mortals ultimately define ourselves by measuring our distance from the divine manifested in the world.27

Within the framework of late Nishida’s philosophy, it would not make sense to talk about a numinous otherness concealed “behind” the manifested world. Stating that there is nothing mysterious or numinous behind the finite forms we encounter in experience, Nishida declares himself a thorough positivist:「自己自身を限定する形の背後に、何等の基体的ななるものを考えてはならない。それは神秘思想に過ぎない。私は徹底的実証主義者である」(X 37).28 Nishida’s change of attitude towards mysticism is telling in this respect. Whereas in his early works Nishida always referred to the mystical tradition in positive terms, underscoring the analogies with his own thought, in his later writings he distanced himself from mysticism. He started by criticizing the outcome of Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness as a capitulation to mysticism, which the
introduction of the notion of locus was supposed to redress, and ended up giving a negative assessment of Western mysticism and of “mystical thought” in general—qualified as the idea that there is something behind empirical reality, as in the statement on positivism quoted above.  

The difference highlighted above encompasses several aspects of Nishida’s and Heidegger’s thought, and is related to their different attitudes towards human experience. Although both describe experience as a symmetrical movement of passive receptivity and positive activity, Nishida often stresses the positive, poietic element (ポエシス), whereas Heidegger tends to emphasize the element of receptive acceptance. Nishida’s human beings are proactively involved in the vicissitudes of the world as historical subjects, taking part into God’s act of creation as, so to say, God’s vicars on earth. Borrowing from the dialectical scheme of Scotus Eriugena to which Nishida had referred in Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness, one may say that in later Nishida’s philosophy individuals are God as natura creata et creans, as Eriugena defined Christ in his double nature of human and God. Heidegger, on the contrary, tends to equate a proactive attitude with the metaphysical 

hybris connected to the world of technology and oblivion of being (Seinsvergessenheit) that has been unfolding through the history of Western civilization to reach its maturity in the modern age. He consistently describes the proper attitude towards the appropriating event with expressions the indicate passivity, like the “letting be” ("releasement" Gelassenheit) characterized as the “waiting” of the self-opening of the region (das Warten auf das Sichöffnen der Gegnet G 52). Later Heidegger’s humans are more akin to quietistic contemplators who, gazing at the worlding of the world, piously wait for a sign from the unknown absolute, than to proactive shapers of the world. They must remain silently compliant (hörig) to be ready to hear the voice of the divine. While Nishida as a philosopher looks to the logic of absolute contradictory self-identity to find an Eastern logic as “self-awareness of the Eastern life,” Heidegger sees in Sigetik—the practice of theoretical “silence” (BP 78 f.)—the only possible thinking approach to reality as given in the modern world of Seinsvergessenheit. Such different attitudes are clearly on display in the two philosophers’ different concepts of art. While Nishida emphasizes the act of artistic creation, conceiving it as a poietic act in which the subject comes close to unilaterally determining the object, thereby overcoming human limits and almost becoming god （神となる IX 272）, Heidegger focuses on the artwork itself, describing artistic activity as a mere receptive act of bringing forth (hervorbringen) a being out of concealment, drawing it out of the earth to which it belongs, as water is drawn out of a spring (H 62). For Heidegger, the artist’s role, as emblematic of human activity, is merely instrumental to the gushing of truth out of the ultimate, mysterious source defined as earth in The Origin of the Work of Art.
Hidden God and Revealed Nothingness

From the point of view of Nishida’s philosophy, the difference in the formal dynamic of locus and clearing could be reduced to the fact that Heidegger’s position was not sufficiently radical, as per the above-mentioned criticism. It might be argued that the notion of concealment refers to an unknowable “something” thought of as hiding “behind” the things manifested in the opening of the clearing, and is therefore still within the horizon of western objectifying thought. Later Heidegger’s position would probably be qualified by Nishida himself as a form of mystical thought, unable to get rid of the last remnants of objectivistic representation lurking in mysticism, and indeed Heidegger’s debt to medieval mysticism is well documented. For Nishida, mystical thought is the result of objective logic, which, insofar as it is unilaterally oriented towards the noematic side of reality, fails to grasp its ultimate ground, so that the absolute can only be conceived as a hidden mystery. Nishida’s philosophical development itself can be interpreted as the evolution from a position akin to Western mystical thought, in which he conceived the absolute as some sort of godhead beyond the world of finite things—either as pantheistic natura naturans or as panentheistic locus as divine milieu—to a deeper position that overcame mysticism thanks to the non-objective logic of contradictory self-identity, leading to a more rational, mundane idea of the absolute as the dialectical dynamic of the world, creating itself not out of some transcendent, mysterious absolute nothingness, but as that nothingness determining itself.

Mystical thought, however, cannot always be reduced to a byproduct of objective logic, being more often the expression of a living experience in which the mystery is felt rather than inferred from the impossibility to represent the absolute as an object—or, as Nishida’s own ill-conceived “mystical” notion of absolute free will, inferred from the impossibility to explain the contingency of the concrete world of experience. Neither does Heidegger’s idea of concealment imply an objectified “something” hiding behind manifested things. As we have seen, the “hiding place” of the clearing is not somewhere behind the cleared region, but rather the side of the region that is hidden to us. The hidden source of reality is no more transcendent to the manifestation of reality than it is immanent to it. And Heidegger’s insistence on concealment is not simply an “objective” description of the way things are, expressing instead the existential feeling of finitude and a way to relate to reality as sacred. Throughout his entire philosophical career, Heidegger stressed the fact that we are not the lords of being, since we neither control nor understand the act by which we come into existence and reality is given to us in experience. In this respect, the notion of concealment is the heir of Being and Time’s existential concepts expressing human finitude and the corresponding existential feelings, such as facticity, thrownness, and anxiety.

From a cultural point of view, as the numinous that withdraws and conceals itself while beckon-
ing to the mortals, Heidegger’s appropriating event is reminiscent of the deus absconditus, the hidden God of the Judeo-Christian tradition who ambiguously reveals himself to Moses on mount Horeb while at the same time concealing himself, thus prompting the prophet Isaiah to declare, “Truly, you are a God who hides himself.”\textsuperscript{36} The European onto-theological tradition grounded itself in what E. Gilson has called the “metaphysics of Exodus,\textsuperscript{37}” the ontological interpretation of God’s words to Moses inspired by the standard translation of the Septuagint and the Vulgate: “I am the one who is” (ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ ὄν, ego sum qui sum). But the mystical, apophatic tradition refused such ontological interpretation, and chose instead to emphasize the “thick darkness” in which God hid himself during the revelation,\textsuperscript{38} which hints at the alternative, and likely more correct, translation of God’s words as a refusal to reveal his name and his nature: “I am who I am.”\textsuperscript{39}

From the point of view of Heidegger’s notion of concealment, the charge of not being sufficiently radical brought against Heidegger can easily be turned against Nishida: The difference between the two thinkers can be ascribed to the fact that Nishida thought within the horizon of metaphysics—understood not only as western metaphysics, but as the universally human tendency that underpins western metaphysics. His absolutization of nothingness, and the systematic, exhaustive description of the dialectical self-determination of reality bear the unmistakable marks of metaphysical thinking. J. Krummel has argued that such metaphysical tendency in Nishida’s thought might depend on the adoption of the western linguistic and conceptual framework, on whose limitations Nishida had not enough time to reflect, being one of the first Japanese thinkers to confront themselves with western philosophy.\textsuperscript{40} Although that is likely part of the problem, in my opinion the tendency has deeper roots than the adoption of a foreign conceptual vocabulary, which may be considered a historical accident unrelated to Nishida’s true intentions. As we have seen, one of the main functions of the notion of locus was to provide a causal explanation of the experiential world, as its sufficient condition, and this purpose remained unchanged throughout the evolution of the concept into ideas like absolute nothingness and world as dialectical universal. Indeed, Nishida had been concerned with providing an exhaustive explanation of reality since the beginning of his philosophical career, as he declared in unequivocal terms in the Preface to \textit{An Inquiry into the Good}, where he famously stated his intent to “explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality” (純粋経験を唯一の在実としてすべてを説明して見たい I, 6). He restated the same goal in the Preface to \textit{Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness},\textsuperscript{41} and it was the inability to achieve it that led him to a “capitulation to mysticism” and then to the introduction of the more rational notion of locus.

Nishida’s position can be said to be metaphysical because it entails the attempt to give an ultimate, transparent explanation of reality in which nothing is left unaccounted for, nothing is unknown, except for, at most, nothingness itself. O. Pöggeler has remarked that early Heidegger
resorted to finitude as the ultimate foundation of thought, in which nothing is presupposed but “naked nothingness” itself, and being thus becomes its own foundation.\textsuperscript{42} Such remark may be partially applied to later Nishida’s tenet that nothing mysterious and unknowable is behind the appearance of things, and the ultimate foundation of reality is nothingness itself, within which being is seen (thought) as being.\textsuperscript{43} In his final completed essay, *The Logic of Locus and the Religious Worldview* (「場所的論理と宗教的世界観」), Nishida explicitly elevated nothingness to the rank of ultimate metaphysical foundation of reality, asserting that reality exists thanks to a necessary and transparent mechanism of contradictory self-identity: Nothingness is self-negation, therefore it becomes its own contradiction, that is, being.

「我々が神と云ふものを論理的に表現する時、斯く云ふの外にない。神は絶対の自己否定として、逆対応的に自己自身に対し、自己自身の中に絶対的自己否定を含むものなるが故に、自己自身によって有るものであるのであり、絶対の無なるが故に絶対の有であるのである」 (X 316).\textsuperscript{44}

Nothingness is negation, and because, as it were, there is nothing else to negate, nothingness cannot but negate itself, thereby necessarily morphing into being and originating the metaphysical dynamic of self-determination of the world. Despite R. Nozick’s semiserious—and inadequate in many respects—comparison of Heidegger’s idea of nothingness to the self-sucking vacuum cleaner of the Beatles’ cartoon *Yellow Submarine*,\textsuperscript{45} Heidegger equated being and nothingness,\textsuperscript{46} but did not formulate any generative dialectical relationship between the two. For Heidegger “nothing itself noths” (*das Nichts selbst nichtet* W 114), but Nishida went a step further by unequivocally asserting that nothing necessarily noths itself.

It is unlikely that Nishida, owing to an insufficient grasp of the implications of the western linguistic and conceptual apparatus, was not fully aware of the meaning and implications of the sentence “to explain everything.” The desire to fully understand reality is not a peculiarly western trait that an East Asian thinker can acquire only through cultural borrowing, correlated to an exclusively western original sin of eating the forbidden fruit of the tree of metaphysical knowledge. Such a desire is instead a universally human aspiration, as suggested by the fact that omniscience (*sarvajña* 一切智) is considered one of the characteristics of the Buddhas, particularly in Māhāyāna Buddhism,\textsuperscript{47} and the fact that in traditional China many believed Confucius to have known everything (無所不知).\textsuperscript{48} In the case of Nishida, moreover, the idea that it is possible to fully understand reality is not based only on a personal aspiration, but it is an intrinsic element of his philosophy that follows from the fact that he consistently conceived reality as the self-aware determination of the absolute, i.e., as the manifestation of the absolute to itself. Although the absolute is aware of itself
only through its relative self-determination in individual awareness, an absolute that permanently concealed itself from its concrete loci of self-awareness and was thus essentially unable to fully manifest itself to itself would not be truly absolute, being instead akin to the relativized God whose notion Nishida rejected (X, 315).

Conclusion

For Nishida, not only God as ultimate reality is fully within the grasp of our finite reason, in spite of the fact that as infinite totality it negates and overwhelms us, but it also is endowed with necessary existence, demonstrated by a foolproof a priori argument that does not require the prior circular inclusion of existence in the definition of God. There is therefore no mystery, no unanswerable enigma at the root of existence in Nishida’s final worldview. Leibniz’s ultimate metaphysical puzzle, “Why is there something rather than nothing,” to which Heidegger referred at the beginning of Introduction to Metaphysics, (Einführung in die Metaphysik EM 1 ff.) is solved by the dialectic of absolute nothingness. Leaving aside the problem of the debatable logical validity of Nishida’s argument, however, the puzzle is not simply the result of abstract philosophical musing on metaphysical contingency, requiring as a solution an abstract philosophical argument about metaphysical necessity. It is rather the expression of the existential wonder and awe we can experience when faced with the brute fact of our and the world’s existence, whether we are modern humans living in a demythologized universe or ancient humans living in a still mythologized world, as attested by the more than 3,000-year-old Vedic hymn of creation:

Whence all creation had its origin,
the creator, whether he fashioned it or whether he did not,
the creator, who surveys it all from highest heaven,
he knows—or maybe even he does not know.

Ultimately, Heidegger’s notion of concealment expresses such mystery, to which he had referred in Being and Time as the “naked ‘that’” of existence facing nothingness (das Sein des Daseins als nackte “Dass es ist und zu sein hat” SZ 134; das nackte “Dass” im Nichts der Welt SZ 276), rather than referring to some mysterious thing hidden somewhere. Any comparison between Nishida and Heidegger should take into account such basic difference between their views on ultimate reality, not in order to demote either to a lower position of not-deep-enough thinker, but to better appreciate the possibilities and limitations of a comparison that can be the starting point for a dialogue between East and West. The subordination of either thinker would likely just reflect a sectarian belief in the alleged superiority of a particular worldview, like Zen Buddhism in the case of
many Japanese critics of Heidegger, or Christianity in the case of a criticism of Nishida based on a Christian reading of Heidegger.

If, on the one hand, the mystery to which Heidegger refers can neither be reduced to a shortcoming of objective logic nor explained away with a dialectic argument, on the other hand, Nishida’s striving to express reality within a systematic framework reflects a deep human need that cannot be rejected by simply stigmatizing it as “metaphysics,” a label that many Heideggerian thinkers—including Heidegger himself—often used as a scarlet letter that makes it impossible to reflect on systematic philosophy without dismissing it as a mistake or as something that belongs to a dead past and will be superseded in a new beginning. Indeed, the feeling of the mystery expressed in the idea of concealment and the aspiration to a systematic explanation are two sides of the same coin: It is the wonderment about the mystery that prompt us to try to understand reality, and it is the ultimate failure to fully understand what is essentially hidden to us that makes us acknowledge the depth of the mystery.

Notes

1) “In Heidegger’s case, traces of the representation of nothingness as some ‘thing’ that is nothingness still remain.” Nishitani, Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, trans. van Bragt, Jan, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1982, p. 96. A similar position is expressed by Abe, Masao in his widely-read Zen and Western Thought, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989, p. 119.

2) See, for instance, K. Mizoguchi’s warning that Heidegger’s reflections on the historicity of being should prompt followers of Nishida to ask how it is possible to think nothingness without falling into a metaphysical, objectivistic notion of eternal nothingness. 滝 宏平「西田哲学とハイデガー哲学」（Nishida's Philosophy and Heidegger's Philosophy）（大巻顕編『西田哲学を学ぶ人のために』京都 世界思想社 1996, pp. 71f. 71 f.).


4) In the references to Nishida’s work, the Latin numerals refer to the volume, the Arabic numerals to the pages of the new edition of the Complete Works （西田幾多郎全集 東京 岩波書店 2002–2009）. References to and page numbers of Heidegger’s works are indicated in the text in brackets, according to the following abbreviations:

BP: Beiträge zur Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe Band 65, Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 1989
EM: Einführung in die Metaphysik, 3. Aufl., Tübingen, M. Niemeyer, 1966
G: Gelassenheit, Pfulligen, G. Neske, 1959
N: Nietzsche, Bd. 2, Pfulligen, G. Neske, 1961
5) Early Heidegger denied the existence of things in themselves in many statements: “nur solange Dasein ist, das heißt die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, “gibt es” Sein.” (SZ 212) Later Heidegger held the same point of view, as demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt by his answer to a direct question about the existence of the outer world asked by Medard Boss: “Sein, Offenbarkeit des Seins, gibt es immer nur als Anwesenheit von Seiendem. Damit Seiendes anwesen kann und es mithin überhaupt Sein, Offenbarkeit des Seins geben kann, braucht es das Innestehen des Menschen des Da, in die Lichtung, die Gelichtheit des Seins, als welche der Mensch existiert. Also kann es Sein von Seiendem ohne den Menschen gar nicht geben.” (ZS 221, see 224) A similar position is explicitly stated in An Inquiry into the Good (see chapter 6 of Part II, “Phenomena of Consciousness are the Sole Reality”) and later Nishida still considers real only what enters into a field of experience: To be real means to be “doing” (行む), to interact with something else through mutual apprehension. The concept of something active outside of experience is for Nishida just a sort of metaphysical dream: “経験界を離れて、僕く物の世界を考えることが形而上学的といふことである。それは一種の夢に過ぎない。” (VII 120).


7) See mine アンドレア レオナルディ 「ハイデッガーの太陽」 (Heidegger’s Sun) (『哲学研究』第573号 2002, pp. 50–71).

8) See Nishida’s well-known argument in III 415 f.

9) “Der Versuch in “Sein und Zeit” § 70, die Räumlichkeit des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit zurückzuführen, läßt sich nicht halten.” (SD 24)

10) The first to notice the problem of spatiality in Being and Time was probably T. Watsuji: 和辻哲郎『風土』 (Fudo) 東京 岩波書店 1979, p. 3 (first published in 1931).

11) See BP 379 ff.

12) Space and time had entirely different functions within the theoretical systems of Nishida and of Heidegger from the start, being more important in the framework of Being and Time than in that of An Inquiry into the Good, where they were considered secondary forms for the unification of the content of experience, with no meaning as fundamental structures of reality. (See I, 23 f.). See mine “Locus and Space” in 『西田哲学会年報』第7号 2010, pp. 183–158 (page numbers in reverse order).

13) III 415. See also VII 216 f.

14) Plato, Timaios 51b. In Plato’s unwritten doctrines, the concept of khôra is subsumed under the general concept of indeterminate multiplicity (ἄπειρον πάληθος) that constitutes the principium individuationis of intelligible forms as well as of sensible things, qualified also as dyad of big and small (ἄριθμος δῶς μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ), i.e., as principle of quantity and extension. The extension of the principle of khôra to the intelligible world makes it even closer to Nishida’s
concept of locus, as locus is also the universal as arena within which notions and things are determined in their conceptual content. On Plato's esoteric doctrines, see Krämer, Hans, Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics, ed. and trans. by Catan, J.R., Albany, State University Press of New York, 1990.


16) 「自己自身の中に絶対の他を見るとき考えられる真の自覚といふのは、社会的でなければならない。人と人との空間的関係によって基礎付けられてなければならない」(V 306).


18) See E. Weinmayr, op. cit.


20) The image of a luminous mirror reflecting itself refers to J. Böhme and the Neoplatonic tradition (I 191), but also to Zen tradition. See 戍上克人「西田哲学における宗教的なもの」(The Religious in Nishida’s Philosophy) (「西田哲学を学ぶ人のために」, op. cit., p. 266 ff).

21) According to the index of names in Nishida’s Complete Works, Cusanus is quoted only in An Inquiry into the Good in relation to the apophatic conception of God. It is reasonable, though, to assume that Nishida’s understanding of Plotinus, instrumental to the genesis of the notion of locus, was influenced by his earlier acquaintance with members of the Neoplatonic tradition of the Renaissance like Cusanus and Böhme. A possible influence of Cusanus’s metaphorical imagery on the later development of the logic of locus can be seen in the metaphors of the ultimate locus as an infinite circle with no circumference in which every point is a center (see VI, 188). In this respect, the instantaneous self-determination of the individual can be described as the self-reflective contraction of the endless sphere into a point, and simultaneously as the expansion of the circle from one of its focal points of self-expression and activity.

22) 「我々の自己の一が、自己自身の世界を限定する唯一の個として、絶対の一者を表現すると共に、逆に絶対の一者自証表現として、一者自己射影点となる」(X, 559).

23) See N 250 f.: “Das Sein ist das Leerste und zugleich der Reichtum, aus dem alles Seiende... begabt wird mit der jeweiligen Wesenart seines Seins.”

24) The gods do need humans insofar as human experience is the field in which being comes to presence, but such need of the gods does not mean direct dependence on humans: “Die Götter brauchen nicht den Menschen” (B 225).

25) 「個人の自己は（中略）個人的自己によって呼ぶ他のものである」(V 316).

26) 「個物は一が自覚的である。（中略）我々の自己は世界の自覚的事実である。（中略）物理的思惟に於ても、所謂粒子とはこの如き性質のものでなければならない」(X 41 f.). This position
was already clear in I and Thou (’私と汝‘) see V 276 f.), where Nishida also briefly qualified the opposition to things (物) as different form the opposition to thou (V 381). The difference, however, can easily be explained in terms of a mere quantitative difference, as can the relationship to animals, which, according to Nishida, do not relate to a personality as thou (V 310).

27) “...dieses Durhmessen unternimmt der Mensch nicht gelegentlich, sondern in solchem Durchmessen ist der Mensch überhaupt erst Mensch...der Mensch hat sich als Mensch immer schon an etwas und mit etwas Himmlischen gemessen” (VA 188).

28) There are passages where Nishida qualifies the ground of reality as “absolute irrationality” (絶対の非合理性 V 332), but they seem to refer to the impossibility to fully contain (that is, to rationally subsume under a predicate) both totality and an individual thou within any single individual consciousness.

29) I have analyzed Nishida’s final position on mysticism in “Mysticism and the Notion of God in Nishida’s Philosophy of Religion,” in Philosophy East and West, 64:2, 2014, pp. 449–472.

30) 「同一は無にして有なるもの、自己自身に於て矛盾のなるもの、即ち矛盾的自己同一でなければならない。東洋の生命の自覚には、世界のかかる論理的把握があると思う。これを東洋的理性と云ふことができる」 (X 148).

31) It is worth noting that one of the commonly suggested etymological explanations of the term “mystic” is that of “silent,” from the verb μυέω, to shut (one’s mouth or eyes). In this sense, Heidegger’s idea of Sigetik may not be too far from the notion of mysticism Nishida criticized in his final years.


33) Nishida considers his final position a kind of panentheism (万有在神論 X, 317), but I have argued that it is rather his earlier idea of locus that is close to the original meaning of the word: “Mysticism and the Notion of God in Nishida’s Philosophy of Religion,” cit., pp. 459 f. Nishida may have borrowed the concept from the monk Sôen Shaku (日頭宗演), who qualified Zen as panentheism in a speech translated into English by his student (and Nishida’s lifelong friend) D.T. Suzuki: Zen for Americans, trans. by Suzuki, Daisetsu T., New York, Dorset Press, 1987 (first published in 1906), p. 6.

34) 「対象論理的にのみ考えをへ人には、自己を立って居る足許が見えないのである。面して自己の視野に入り来ざるものは神秘と考へるのである。現れといふのは何処までも結び附かない時間と空間とか結び附いて居る所である。それは何処までも相反する両方向の自己同一、即ち矛盾の自己同一と考えられるものでなければならない」 (VIII, 125).

35) E. Weinmayr has argued that the difference between Nishida and Heidegger derives from the different relation that thought and experience have for Europeans and Asians: Nishida went from experience to thought, Heidegger from thought to experience. Such distinction of “logorrheic” Westerners versus “silent” Asians is, as Weinmayr himself admits, a bit simplistic, and, I would add, a bit stereotypical. The mystical tradition to which Heidegger referred is a genuine experiential tradition, and Nishida’s aspiration to explain everything was an aspiration to grasp reality logically (論理的把握), not to experience it in a pre-conceptual fashion. E. ワインメヤー「西田とハイデッガー」 (Nishida and Heidegger) (「思想」第 857 号 1995, pp. 88–166).


41) 「余の所謂自覚的体系の形式に依ってすべての実在を考へ」（IV 5）。
43) 「作用的なるもの。自覚的なるものは否定されて。すべてが単に有るものとなる。無を見る自己が有るものを限定するのである。かかる意味に於て私は自己自身を限定する者を場所といえばのである」（IV 307）。
44) “This is the only way we can express God logically. As absolute self-negation, God relates to itself inverse-corrrespondently, and because it contains within itself absolute self-negation, it exists by virtue of itself: Because it is absolute nothingness, it is absolute being” (my translation). 
46) See VS 101.
49) Y. Nakamura has argued that Nishida tried to build a system comparable to those of the great western philosophers, but never realized that his philosophy ended up betraying his aspiration, because, in its striving with language and the expression of what cannot be easily expressed, it “bulged out” from the rigid framework of a conceptual system. 中村 雄二郎 (Nishida Kitarō) (中村雄二郎著第7巻) 東京 岩波書店, pp. 209 ff. Nakamura’s argument is interesting, but it is not self-evident that Nishida’s striving towards a systematic conceptual grasp of reality was due exclusively to the influence of western metaphysics, and, in any case, Nishida’s philosophy cannot be easily separated from his systematic ideal.
50) Rigveda, 10:129, Translated by A. L. Basham.