As we approach the seventy-fifth Anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, we ask why does this conflict so divide the governments and peoples of Asia and the Pacific Rim? Before I begin, please let me express my biases that stem from a deep respect for the successes of post-1945 Japan, most notably the creation of a stable parliamentary democracy based on the rule of law. In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, academic freedom is explicitly protected by the Japanese constitution. In the area of foreign affairs, Japan has a remarkable history of using soft power since 1945 to further their national interest, as well as promote global stability. Moreover, the United States and Japan have forged a strong alliance that has been mutually beneficial to both countries, although not without tension. For instance, the continuing presence of military bases on Okinawa remains a significant source of conflict between the two countries.

Japanese attitudes toward the memory of World War II are not monolithic, and my two earlier visits to Japan helped me gain a better understanding of the starkly different ways the Japanese remember this conflict. In 2004, when I was in residence at Kobe University, I can still remember how stunned I was when a graduate student attending one of my talks asked me to comment on the antiwar clauses of the Japanese Constitution and became emotionally distressed at any effort to overturn them. During this trip, I followed the advice of my graduate advisor, Professor John W. Chambers, and visited the Military Museum at the Yasukuni Shrine and also Hiroshima Peace Park, and through the hospitality of Professor Yutaka Sasaki, the Osaka Peace Museum. Since the controversies that surround the Yasukuni Shrine are widely known, and I suspect most Japanese citizens have probably visited Hiroshima Peace Park, I will not discuss my critique of them in any detail. However, several observations left a deep impression. With regard to the Hiroshima Peace Park, I was struck by this site’s museum offering a balanced portrayal of one of the most controversial and tragic events of the Twentieth Century. In visiting the war museum at Yasakuni, my initial reaction was: “This is a good deal like the Imperial War Museum in London and similar institutions..."
with standard display of weapons, medals, uniforms and images." Although I was aware of the many controversies regarding the Shrine, I was unprepared for the extremely distorted view of the Japanese war in China. Moreover, I was disappointed by how little attention was given to the social history of the Japanese soldier, especially the suffering they endured often because of inept generals. One of the great strengths of the Osaka Peace Museum would be its attention to the impact of war on the rank and file who serve in the foxhole.

In considering the enduring controversies over the memory of World War II, please let me express my surprise that Japan has not sought to put these controversies to rest. If Japan is seeking to forge stronger alliances with partners in Asia to counter growing Chinese power, disputes over Japanese actions during the war continue to sow divisions with potential allies, such as South Korea. From a pragmatist point of view, why give China the propaganda advantage on the world stage by failing to take responsibility for the Nanjing Massacre? In private conversations with Japanese colleagues, I have expressed the wish that the Japanese governments and the Japanese people would follow the German example in reconciling with the past. Although West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950s cast aspersion of war crime trials as “victor’s justice” to pander to domestic audiences, his government paid reparations to the State of Israel. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the West German judicial system pursued Nazi war criminals implicated in the Holocaust.

In 1985, the President of West Germany offered an exhaustive summary of the crimes of the Nazi regime before an address to Parliament marking the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Beginning in earnest in the 1980s, the German Government and many communities have commemorated the German Jewish presence and the Holocaust with monuments and museums, including a major one in the center of the capital of Berlin. In the current political climate, can we ever expect a Japanese Government dedicating a memorial to the Nanjing Massacre?

In the early 1990s, when I was writing my first book, Remembering War the American Way, the Pacific War still evoked strong memories among Americans. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush, who had served as a naval aviator in the Pacific War, and only narrowly escaped death in combat, took part in commemorative ceremonies on the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. In 1995, fierce opposition developed to a planned exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Opponents denounced the planned exhibit that centered around the American nuclear attacks on Japanese cities as inaccurate and apologetic. Critics forced a cancellation of the exhibit and the resignation of the museum’s director. They called into question any exhibit or “revisionist” historical work that sought to cast doubt on the wisdom of using nuclear weapons in the Second World War. What always surprised me about this historical debate waged in public was the complete lack of
discussion of the role of the Soviet Union in bringing about the collapse of Japanese resistance, or the problematic decision to modify the Potsdam declaration.\textsuperscript{7}

The American memory of the Pacific War has always been a parochial one, and largely discounted the roles of America’s Allies in this struggle. Few Americans recognize the strategic significance of the war in China or as the historian Russell Weigley observes in the \textit{American Way of War}, the U.S. ground forces never confronted the bulk of either the German army or the Japanese army. If this had been the case, the casualty rates for American forces would have been staggering and the U.S. certainly would not have remembered World War II as the “good” war.\textsuperscript{8} Part of this stemmed from how the Cold War altered our view of China’s role in the war. The United States’ response to the success of the Communist Revolution in China was to simply ignore the People’s Republic of China diplomatically and adopt a policy of non-recognition, only changed under President Richard M. Nixon in 1971. Americans, when they focused on the Chinese role in the Second World War, largely viewed 1931-1945 as a harbinger for the rise to power of Mao. For conservatives, the question asked in the immediate postwar era: who was responsible for losing China? There remained a counter interpretation of the “loss” of China that argued the Nationalists were corrupt, inept, and lacked the ability to fight an effective war against Japan.

The memory of the war in China mirrored what I would argue was the failed diplomacy of the Great Powers regarding the postwar settlement. Perhaps the most classic instance would be the “temporary” division of the Japanese colony of Korea by the Soviet Union and United States. This division would be solidified during the Cold War and seems enduring. In the case of Europe, the division of Germany and Austria would not become permanent. In fact, even before the Cold War ended, Austria would be reunified as the Four Allied Powers left the country in the 1950s under a peace agreement that required this sovereign nation to embrace neutrality. In sharp contrast, the United States along with several Western Allies decided to “go it alone in signing a peace treaty with Japan in 1951. Neither the Soviet Union nor the People’s Republic of China participated in the peace conference or became signatories of the treaty.\textsuperscript{9} It is striking that Russia and Japan have still not reached a final peace settlement regarding the Second World War, in part because of continuing territorial disputes. It will be interesting to see if recent diplomatic talks between the two countries lead to a final settlement.\textsuperscript{10}

Great Power diplomacy remained far more successful for developing a framework for successfully ending the Second World War in Europe. The Second World War has not fostered the same level of controversy as found in Asia. Despite all their disagreements, Great Britain, the U.S., and the Soviet Union were united on the need for a denazified Germany and a four-power occupation of Germany. What had been intended as a temporary division would last for the duration of the Cold War. Once the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, there existed a clear legal framework for German
reunification.

No doubt the Cold War fostered the speedy reintegration of West Germany and East Germany into what became the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Although the Western Allies rehabilitated many former Nazis, there existed no tolerance for the emergence of neo-Nazism in Germany. There were a significant numbers of Germans in the immediate post World War II who remained unrepentant, but there existed little space to publicly espouse Nazism. Germany not only outlawed the Nazi party and the public display of Nazi symbols, but they made the denial of the Holocaust a criminal offense.

In contrast to Japan, neither East Germany nor West Germany renounced their sovereign right to make war, and both actively reconstituted their armed forces with the blessing of the Soviet Union for East Germany and the Western Allies for West Germany. It might be added that German rearmament produced substantial misgivings by French leaders in the late 1940s and 1950s. Both German armies during the Cold War were integrated into the command structures of the NATO and Warsaw Pact. It should also be added that throughout the Cold War, West Germany avoided deploying troops abroad, conscious of the legacy of the record of German aggression. Even East Germany would only cautiously engage in foreign wars supported by the Eastern bloc. For instance, during the Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia in 1968, the role of the East German army centered on providing logistical support.

Even during the worst moments of the Cold War, the United States engaged the Soviet Union diplomatically. Moreover, the legal basis for Great Britain, France, and the United States for maintaining zones in Berlin rested on World War II era agreements. Even when the Western Allies granted sovereignty to West Germany in the 1950s, they still reserved the right to have the final say on German reunification. One legacy of this war-time cooperation that continued for decades would be the four powers “occupied” Berlin. They regularly took turns overseeing control of the international Spandau Prison that housed Nazi war criminals convicted by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal.

In the United States the memory of the Second World War has taken a steadily Eurocentric focus. The first significant wave of memorial making in the United States for the Second World War only began in the late 1970s and 1980s and it centered on the remembrance of the Holocaust. The commemoration of D-Day, the Allied landing in Normandy, France on June 6, 1944, took on growing importance in the American memory and U.S. Presidents have regularly attended international commemorative events, beginning with President Ronald Reagan in 1984. The first major national museum dedicated to the Second World War in New Orleans initially started out as the D-Day Museum. In 2001, the City of Bedford, Virginia dedicated a major memorial commemorating D-Day. President George W. Bush would speak at the dedication ceremonies helping to emphasize the
national significance of the memorial and of the events it commemorated.\textsuperscript{11}

In contrast to the war in Europe, time has dimmed the memory of the Pacific War in the United States. As president, Barack Obama did visit the Arizona Memorial on several occasions, but he did not take part in ceremonies at this site to mark the seventieth or seventy-fifth anniversaries of the attack on Pearl Harbor. For two generations, supporters of military preparedness sought to forge a memory of Pearl Harbor that stressed the need for vigilance. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 have much greater resonance among Americans, especially since most Americans alive no longer have a personal recollection of the events of December 7, 1941.\textsuperscript{12}

The fading of the Pacific War for Americans is in some ways not surprising. Memory of the past is anything but fixed or enduring. As an historian, it is striking what average Americans have forgotten about past wars. Most Americans bear no grudge against our former colonial overlords, even for burning the White House and Capitol during the War of 1812. Americans do not remember our former imperial wars, especially the Spanish American War and the Philippine American War. The Lost Generation of the First World War has been forgotten, except for the fact many of the great works of literature by veterans of this conflict are required reading in many high school or college classes. Except for the fading ranks of veterans who took part in the conflict, few Americans remember the Korean War.\textsuperscript{13}

Of course, not all wars have been forgotten. Americans remain deeply divided and passionate over their Civil War (1861-1865). One reflection of this passion is the simple fact Americans built more memorials commemorating this conflict than any event in our history. Thousands of memorials dot the landscape, older towns and cities East of the Mississippi have at least one war memorial to this conflict.\textsuperscript{14} Recently, the City of New Orleans removed several memorials to the Confederate cause and had to do this work on the cover of darkness for fear regarding public safety of construction workers taking down the monuments.\textsuperscript{15}

The fading of the Pacific War in American memory is not simply the result of the passage of time. Scholars who have studied the Pacific War have characterized the conflict as “War without Mercy and “War without Rules.” Many veterans who served in the Pacific never forgot and one of the questions I frequently sought to ask regarding passions about the war was, “Would you/have you bought a Japanese car?” A significant number answered negatively. In the State of New Mexico, the dominant public commemoration of the war is the memory of the disproportionate number of National Guard troops from this state who served in the Philippines and surrendered on Bataan. The Bataan Death March and the suffering endured by New Mexican soldiers is central to the state’s memorialization of this conflict, not the fact the state played a central role in the development of the atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{16}

How does a nation apologize? This at times can become an existential question with important
legal, political, and diplomatic consequences. In the case of the Pacific War, the United States Government did formally apologize to Japanese Americans for the grave injustices visited on them during the Second World War. Japanese Americans, non-citizens, but also those holding U.S. citizenship, were placed in euphemistically named internment camps based on racist assumptions that they would threaten American security during the war. This apology would win approval in the U.S. Congress in 1988 and President Ronald Reagan heartily endorsed the legislation along with limited compensation.19

Japanese Americans, historians, and Hollywood filmmakers all played an important role after World War II in bringing attention to this grave injustice. After 1945, there were few defenders of the internment camps. As early as the 1950s, high school and college history textbooks either ignored the issue or roundly condemned this action, in some cases even terming them concentration camps. There is a fascinating series of films that stress the loyalty and patriotic service of Japanese Americans that came out in the 1950s and 1960s, including Go For Broke (1951), Bad Day at Black Rock (1955), and Hell to Eternity (1960). Starring Spencer Tracy, Bad Day at Black Rock is an especially fascinating film for portraying a whole town as full of evil Americans, complicit in the murder of a Japanese American farmer shortly after Pearl Harbor.20

The imperatives of the Cold War can partly explain why Americans after 1945 put aside the animosities of war. Similarly, the lack of any significant resistance to the American occupation of Japan certainly contributed to a softening of American attitudes toward a former enemy. But there are deeper reasons for this pattern of forgetfulness regarding the memory of the Second World War that stems from the often-concerted efforts by Americans to depoliticize the commemoration of war. Americans, in consciously forgetting, often stress the importance of honoring the soldier, even if they disagree over his/her cause.21 This paradigm would play an important part in forging reconciliation between Americans after the Civil War. Grappling with the question of reconciliation and finding common ground between northerners and southerners, many white Americans decided that a national memory of the war should focus on recognizing the mutual bravery of those, who not only fought for the federal government, but also those who took part in the rebellion. Americans have extended this sentiment to other former adversaries. For instance, Americans during the interwar years embraced the novel and film, All Quiet on the Western Front. The widespread interest in this work by a German author that stresses the essential humanity of the German soldier is all the more remarkable given the lurid war-time propaganda issued regarding the blood thirsty Hun.22 Until the Nazis came to power in 1933, some American and German war veterans did hold joint reunions and exchanged war stories dwelling on their shared experiences of fighting in the trenches.23

Many American veterans of the Second World War bore deep hatred of the Japanese as their
enemy that did not fade over the years. But many did not; two veterans of the Pacific War, presidents Gerald R. Ford and George H.W. Bush, who almost died in the war, played pivotal roles in seeking to promote reconciliation. Many veterans and American society sought to either ignore the war or recast the image of the Pacific War. During the war itself, the image of Japan as the enemy represented some of the worst dehumanization of an enemy. (In sharp contrast, Hollywood films made during the war in Europe often make a distinction between the evil Nazis and misguided Germans.)

In the aftermath of the war, there would be a small, but steady stream films that portrayed the Japanese as worthy opponents that fought tenaciously and bravely. Perhaps the most remarkable of these films would be _Tora, Tora, Tora_ (1971); arguably one of the most historically authentic films made about a battle. More recently, this sentiment would be expressed by Clinton Eastwood’s _Letters from Iwo Jima_ (2006) that portrayed the Japanese defenders of Iwo Jima in an empathetic light. The Japanese commander is depicted as an honorable soldier who served his country bravely.

Is there a collective embarrassment by many Americans, especially national elites, at the racism prevalent in the war against Japan? Has this cast a shadow on the differing memories of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crime trials? The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg has garnered significant attention from scholars, but also left an indelible mark on American culture. Nuremberg is widely cited by political leaders, legal scholars, and historians as a positive and enduring legacy of the Second World War. The effort to render justice in the aftermath in the war in Europe fostered an Academy award winning film, _Judgment at Nuremberg_, and host of other cultural productions. In contrast, the Tokyo trials garnered scant attention from scholars. For decades, the standard work in English by an American academic was Richard Minear’s, _Victor’s Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial_ (1971). Only recently has there been an effort for a more balanced critique of the Tokyo trials. Spurred by Korean Americans, there has also been an effort to build memorials marking the tragic experiences of comfort women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military.

Please let me emphasize a central point that I think can contribute to current questions about the great divide in memory between Japan and former enemies; there is nothing inevitable about them. I think the pattern I have described suggests the malleability of memory and commemoration in a society. For instance, while memories of the Pacific War are fading in the United States, the exact opposite pattern has emerged with regard to American participation in the struggle against Nazi Germany. In my view, there is no inevitability to the deep controversies engulfing Asia and Japanese society over the Second World War. As Zheng Wang observes in _Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations_ the People’s Republic of China during the Mao years did not make Japanese war crimes as a centerpiece of national memory. Instead, the Mao years placed greater emphasis on commemorating the successful Communist
revolution that brought the regime to power and demonized the Nationalists. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is striking to witness the rehabilitation of the Nationalists by the People’s Republic, even burnishing the image of Chang Kai-Shek.\(^{(27)}\)

Let me highlight the stark difference between Europe and Asia in grappling with the legacy and memory of the Second World War. In 1984, leaders representing the Allied nations that stormed ashore at the Normandy, France gathered to mark the fiftieth anniversary of this landing. Excluded from the ceremonies would be the West German Chancellor and the Soviet Party Secretary. Since 1984, gathering at Normandy has continued to occur every five years, most recently in 2014. But over time, these ceremonies have become more inclusive and they now include the Russian President and even the German Chancellor. Aside from the surrender ceremonies on the deck of the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945, I know of no similar international ceremony ever being held among former allies of the war in the Pacific and Asia to commemorate the Second World War in the postwar era. Moreover, will it ever be possible for the heads of state from America, Australia, China, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (North and South), and Vietnam to gather at an international ceremony commemorating the Second World War? There is a long road ahead before I can imagine this ceremony taking place.

As an historian who specializes in U.S. history, I am very cautious about offering gratuitous advice among how to promote reconciliation across borders in East Asia. Certainly, as academics, we have a role to play to promote cross-national dialogue, and frankly, to produce good scholarship that strives for objectivity. In promoting peace and reconciliation, I would also encourage Japanese historians to embrace the field of military history. Historians in their monographs, scholarly journals, and textbooks should continue to document war crimes committed by armed forces of Japan and other nations. They should also follow the example of Saburo Ienaga’s *The Pacific War, 1931-1945* in also analyzing the strategic and operational failures by Japan’s government and military during the war. Japan’s defeat stemmed not only from Allied strengths, but also the mishandling many aspects of the war effort from the lack of army-navy cooperation, foolish battlefield tactics that wasted human life for no good reason, and callous disregard for the proper care of the wounded. It is striking to consider the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942 and 1943. Japan, having conquered the territories possessing access almost all the quinine in the world, allowed its forces during this battle to loose combat effectiveness because of staggering rates of malarial infection. Japan failed to develop programs that properly trained naval aviator to replace those killed during the Battle of Midway or maintain the initial superiority they held in several weapons systems at the start of the war. Japan war-time leaders should have been indicted by their people for the failures to take adequate civil defense measures to protect the civilian population against the American air campaign.\(^{(28)}\)
Criticism of a nation’s conduct in war-time is by no means unpatriotic. In fact, the critique of a nation’s shortcomings and failure to adhere to stated ideals is one of the highest forms of patriotism. American scholars, some of them active-duty members of the armed forces, have asked difficult questions about the Allied bombing campaign conducted during the Second World War. They have fiercely debated and often seen these questions as inter-related: Was the bombing campaign against Germany, Italy, and Japan as military effective? Was it morally justified to kill so many civilians, especially when the Royal Air Force against Germany, and the U.S. Army Air Force engaged in area bombing targeting civilians?  

I do also want to raise a question and concern regarding Japan’s efforts to rearm and embrace the sovereign right to make war. Are there any efforts to clarify civil-military relations? In reading the Japanese Constitution in an English translation back in 2004, I was struck by the lack of any clauses on civilian control of the military. How will civilian control of the military be exercised? Will the Japanese Diet retain ultimate power to decide on issues of war and peace or will these be vested in the prime minister or senior military leaders?  

A final somber reflection on the legacy of the Second World War and the profoundly different experience of the United States compared with the rest of the world. The continental United States during this war would be spared from any significant impact from the Axis. American cities were not bombed, battles were not fought in the countryside, no occupying forces had to be quartered in people’s homes, and most rationing brought little genuine suffering. In fact, the standard of living for average Americans went up during the war. The United States emerged from this war a super-power and one legacy, lasting for nearly three generations, was an embrace of internationalism and high levels of support for large standing armies. Recent events have called this continued commitment to internationalism into question, most notably the re-emergence of American First in political discourse in the United States. As an historian, the use of this term sets an ominous tone and conjures images of Charles Lindbergh and other members of the American First Movement that opposed intervention in the struggle against Nazi Germany in 1940 and 1941.

The Second World War resulted in unspeakable destruction and killing of soldiers and civilians in equal proportions. Those who remember this violence are now only a small minority and I fear that current political leaders and peoples in Asia and around the world, do not have the same visceral understanding of the cost of conventional war of the scale that occurred in the Second World War. Moreover, there is always the question of miscalculation that can allow a minor territorial dispute to escalate into a major conflict. There is also the unsettled business of the Second World War that includes the lack of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia and the intractable “temporary” division of the Korean Peninsula that hardened into a permanent one as a result of the Cold War. Many also seem to forget that there is also the human and financial cost of preparing for
war. Does Japan, facing a growing demographic crisis, want to have a higher portion of young men and women serving in the military? Japan already spends a significant portion of the national budget on defense, does it want to divert money away from the domestic needs? No less a figure as President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a career army officer before assuming elected office, made clear the cost of war in a speech to newspaper editors in 1953:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.

It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

...  

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron. ²⁰

NOTES

1) Although I visited the Museum at the Shrine, I did not visit the shrine itself. Personally, I believe the military service is an honorable profession and the war dead should be mourned by the living. The decision of the administrators of the Shrine to memorialize convicted war criminals makes this site out of bounds for me. In much the same way, I had no objection to President Ronald Reagan taking part in mourning the war dead who fought for the German Army during the Second World War, but agree with his critics he should have avoided a cemetery that contained the war dead who served under the SS. My understanding of the history of the Shrine and controversies that surround it been informed by Roger B. Jeans, “Victims and Victimizers? Museums Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan” Journal of Military History 69 (January 2005): 145-95 and Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and the Japan’s Unending Postwar (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015).

2) Regrettably, the Osaka Peace which offered exhibits documenting Japanese war crimes in China has sparked concerted opposition from Japanese conservatives. For a discussion of these contro-


5) For the context of this speech, see Geoffrey Hartman, ed., Bitburg: In Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986).


12) When I conducted interviews with members of the World War II generation, as director of the Rutgers Oral History Archives, almost anyone alive during the war could tell me where they were and their reaction to hearing the news of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. To access these interviews, see oralhistory.rutgers.edu.


15) Richard Fausset, “Tempers Flare Over Removal of Confederate Statues in New Orleans” New


17) For examples of this point, see Clark Gutman, Interview with G. Kurt Piehler, January 7, 1995 and Robert Moss, Interview with G. Kurt Piehler and Bryan Holtzmacher, October 13, 1994, Rutgers Oral History Archives, Department of History, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/


21) At times this sentiment was expressed on the battlefield during the Second World War. For instance, one veteran of the battle of Guadalcanal, Marine Sergeant Abraham Felber, wrote in his diary after viewing the Japanese dead from one engagement: “It was sad to see the pictures of their families that were found among their possessions. Just two days ago they had been strong, virile sons, fathers, and husbands; and now they were putrid corpses in some far land.” Franklin Felber in the introduction to Abraham Felber, The Old Breed of Marine: A World War II Diary (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2003) described his father adhering to the unwritten code of the “old breed of Marine” that subscribed to the sentiment: “You respect your enemy. They are husbands, fathers, and sons who fight and die just as bravely as you do.”


27) Zheng Want, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and


